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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores how domestic factions and authoritarian regimes in Japan and Korea 
in the period from the 1850s to 1970s appropriated the concept of “modernity” to gain 
normative superiority over their competitors. The appropriating entity revised the concept 
of modernity to suit its own worldview. Across the case studies, the propaganda of 
modernity created a hierarchy that privileged those who are “more modern,” encouraged 
martial masculinity, and attached itself to existing domestic norms, such as ethno-
nationalism. Under authoritarian regimes, modernity helped justify the mobilization of 
capital, manpower, and other critical resources in the name of nation-building or defense. 
Many factions and demagogues may have initially used the concept of modernity for 
domestic gains, but using this narrative later devolved into foreign conquests and 
imperialist expansion, for otherwise, their call for modernization would have become an 
empty promise in the eyes of the masses. This paper examines five cases along these 
dimensions, namely the rise of reformist samurais in feudal-era Japan, the failure of 
Joseon Korea’s ruling regime to adopt modernity in a timely manner, Imperial Japan’s 
colonial practices in Korea and Manchuria, the ideological divergences among factions in 
Colonial Korea, and a South Korean dictator’s attempts to gain legitimacy following a 
coup d’etat. Each case follows how domestic factions or individuals were motivated by 
an inferiority complex and how they produced their own version of modernity that 
favored their ascendance.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Lukes’ Faces of Power 
This paper examines five case studies in which domestic factions or authoritarian 
regimes struggle for power based on a modified framework of Steven Lukes’ faces of 
power theory. Lukes, a political theorist, posited in Power: A Radical View that power 
has three faces.1 This paper defines the three faces as the following: the first face of 
power consists of Realpolitik and physical power; the second face consists of rights, 
freedoms, and political gains or losses made within the institutional realm; and the third 
face consists of norms and values. An entity that gains dominance in the first face of 
power would have the necessary physical, military force to control others. An entity that 
gains dominance in the second face of power is one that can alter institutions and laws in 
its favor, such as by creating systems of education or healthcare. An entity that dominates 
the third face of power would create norms and values that favor or legitimize its own 
worldviews, or it may create a hierarchy in which its preferred norms would be 
considered superior and more appealing than other existing norms. This process may 
involve attaching the preferred norms to other existing norms that are already salient and 
popular with the masses, rather than simply denying or destroying all other existing 
norms.  
An entity does not necessarily have to be dominant in the first or second faces to 
dominate the third face. Even the entities that are physically powerless can attempt to 
restructure the distribution of authority by creating values and ideologies that legitimize 
                                     
1 Steven Lukes. Power: A Radical View. 2nd ed. Studies in Sociology. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005. 
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their normative power. Such changes in the third face may lead to redistributions of 
power in the first or second faces, depending on how much of a real, physical authority 
the actor can gain.2 If an entity that previously only had third-face power suddenly gains 
first-face power, then this entity may attempt to dominate the first and second faces of 
power as well. 
Motivated Beliefs: Production and Consumption of High-Utility Beliefs 
Entities that seek to dominate the third face of power do so by producing beliefs 
that the masses will be more willing to consume. Economists Roland Bénabou and Jean 
Tirole theorized that humans produce and consume beliefs that have affective or 
functional values. A belief that has an affective value “[makes] oneself or one’s future 
look better,”3 and a belief that has a functional value helps one achieve certain internal or 
external goals.4 The belief that one is a good student, for instance, has affective value in 
that it boosts the individual’s self-esteem. This belief can also have functional value if it 
makes the student more productive and efficient at studying. Some beliefs can have both 
affective and functional values, while others may only have either one. This paper 
analyzes opportunistic entities’ appropriation of modernity and the production of their 
own versions of modernity through this lens, examining how the entities attached 
affective and functional values to their propaganda and push for modernity. The beliefs in 
modernity had affective value for the masses because those who became “modern” could 
                                     
2 The changes in the first, second, and third faces of power are not necessarily sequential. Many of the 
appropriating entities in this paper started with the third face of power simply because they did not have the 
resources or power to influence the other faces. But the changes may happen in a completely different 
sequence or simultaneously. 
3 Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole. "Mindful Economics: The Production, Consumption, and Value of 
Beliefs†." Journal of Economic Perspectives 30, no. 3 (2016)., p.143. 
4 Bénabou and Tirole (2016), p.143. 
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view themselves as superior to pre-modern individuals. The beliefs in modernity had a 
functional value for both the producer of the belief (an opportunistic entity, be it a 
political faction or a despot) and the consumer of the belief (the masses). On the one 
hand, the belief enabled quick and efficient mobilization of resources, manpower, and 
political support for the appropriating entity. On the other, the propaganda potentially had 
functional value for the consumers, i.e. the masses, in that it may have encouraged some 
of the subjects living in modern nation-states to become productive workers, maintain 
better hygiene by complying with the modern state’s healthcare programs, or gain 
literacy at public schools built and funded by the state. However, the net effects of such 
ideologies on the consumers of the beliefs are not always positive. Bénabou and Tirole 
found in their study of the “just-world belief,” such as the ideology of the American 
Dream, for example, that a belief in hard work and merit as a means to social mobility 
can have functional value for making the population in general more productive and can 
induce economic growth. However, at the same time, the net value of such beliefs “to the 
poor is much more ambiguous, since they receive less transfers and are more likely to be 
stigmatized.”5 Likewise, the net value that beliefs of modernity had on the consumer side 
consists of a variety of factors. While the beliefs can have the functional value of 
motivating the masses to be productive members of a modern society, these same beliefs 
legitimized violence against the masses and mobilization of their labor for cheap wages. 
The production and consumption of high-utility beliefs can distort reality. 
Bénabou and Tirole note that consuming beliefs for their affective and functional values 
                                     
5 Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole. "Belief in a just World and Redistributive Politics." The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 121, no. 2 (2006), p.735.  
  7 
can create “some (usually implicit) tradeoff between accuracy and desirability” and that 
choosing to consume certain beliefs will lead to “not wanting to know, wishful thinking, 
and reality denial.”6 Those who wish to see themselves and their nation as “modern” may 
fail to take in real-life evidence that prove their state’s weaknesses, for instance. In fact, 
these beliefs will be the most attractive to individuals, factions, or nations suffering from 
an inferiority complex, or a sense that they are not worthy compared to other more 
powerful entities.  
 
  
                                     
6 Bénabou and Tirole (2016), p.141-142. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Definition of Modernity 
The concept of “modernity” across the five case studies in this paper has three 
common characteristics. First, modernity created a hierarchy in which the faction that 
proved itself as “more modern” could pose itself as superior and therefore more 
deserving of popularity than other factions. Authoritarian regimes similarly used the 
propaganda of modernity to pose themselves as superior to other nations, and especially 
more superior to nations and peoples they planned to colonize. Second, the propaganda of 
modernity emphasized martial masculinity because it helped the mobilization of armed 
forces and legitimized a faction’s use of violence or an authoritarian regime’s territorial 
expansion. Lastly, the propaganda of modernity attached itself to existing norms, such as 
ethno-nationalistic symbols, to reinforce its appeal to the masses.  
First, the propaganda of modernity created a hierarchy and reinforced the masses’ 
desire to raise themselves or their nation to a superior status. This notion of modernity 
also necessitates binary distinctions between those who are “more modern” and those 
who are “less modern.” What it meant to be “more modern” depended on which 
dominant group controlled the discourse on modernity. Prior to World War II, for 
instance, scholars and leaders in Western Europe and the United States (U.S.) used the 
narrative of “civilization” to define modernity. The Europeans and Americans were 
“civilized” and therefore “more modern,” whereas the colonized peoples of Latin 
America, Africa, and Asia were “uncivilized” and “less modern.” However, observing 
the atrocities that took place in Europe during World War II, many intellectuals in the 
colonized parts of the world realized that the Europeans and Americans were not 
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necessarily “civilized.” In turn, leaders in Western Europe and the U.S. saw the need to 
redefine the meaning of “modernity,” and the alternative to the civilization discourse was 
the development discourse. Many identify the origin of the development discourse, which 
focused on the need for technology and industrialization, in Harry S. Truman’s inaugural 
address on January 20th, 1949, in which he proposed that the U.S. “must embark on a 
bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial 
progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.”7 The 
factions and entities throughout this paper similarly appropriated the narrative of 
modernity, modifying existing definitions or creating their own meanings of what it 
meant to be modern, as it suited their best interests.  
Second, the variations of modernity found in the case studies uniformly privileged 
martial masculinity. Although “each person lives gender in a different culture, body, 
language, and identity [and therefore] there is not one gendered experience of global 
politics,” given the diverse and intersectional nature of gender, many societies have 
developed rigid expectations regarding masculinity and femininity.8 The strict delineation 
between masculinity and femininity subsequently led to the prioritization of one over the 
other. Societies have assembled institutions in a manner that favors the so-called 
masculine traits and activities and breeds the excessively masculine behavior among the 
subjects. The idealization of martial masculinity within the discourse of modernity 
allowed for the mobilization of armed forces and the use of violence that was necessary 
                                     
7 Harry S. Truman, "Truman's Inaugural Address, January 20, 1949." Accessed April 19, 2019, Harry S. 
Truman Presidential Library & Museum, 
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/50yr_archive/inagural20jan1949.htm. 
8 Sjoberg, Laura. "Gender, Structure, and War: What Waltz Couldn't See." International Theory 4, no. 1 
(2012), p.9. 
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for competing factions’ and authoritarian regimes’ rise in power.  
Lastly, in the process of appropriating the concept of modernity, the competing 
factions and regimes in this paper attached their own definition of modernity to existing 
domestic norms. The existing norms included ethno-nationalistic symbols, such as 
historical figures that represented a people’s strength, or societal norms that helped the 
control and organization of the masses, such as Confucianism.  
Definition of the Modern State 
The modern state in this paper refers to a singular state, operated by a central 
government, that has effective and efficient control over its population and a monopoly 
over violence. The control over its population is effective in that it has authority over all 
three faces of power in the Lukesian sense. Its control is efficient in that the state 
maintains control over different ethnic groups, eliminates less productive or disruptive 
members of society, and mechanizes the use of labor. Here, “mechanize” does not 
necessarily mean the use of machines, but rather refers to the systematic nature of labor 
acquisition and deployment. Modernity justifies and accelerates the mobilization of 
capital, manpower, land, and other critical resources at times of national crises.  
Use of “Western” as a Descriptor 
This paper frequently uses the descriptor “Western,” not because an East-West 
dichotomy truly exists, but to represent the point of view of the factions, dictators, 
intellectuals, and citizens who produced and consumed ideological beliefs in the case 
studies. The “Western” countries do not refer to nations that belonged to a certain 
geographical region. Rather, they are countries that intellectuals of Japan and Korea 
viewed as superior societies that they must aspire to resemble. The “Western” countries 
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included European nations that set out on colonial conquests and the United States, 
whose normative influences, such as texts by political philosophers and economists, and 
physical shows of strength, had reached Asia.  
East Asian Entities’ Agency in ‘Creating’ Modernity  
The East Asian entities in this paper appropriated the concept of modernity and 
produced their own versions that furthered their own worldviews and political, economic 
gains. Modernity in East Asia, therefore, was not a concept that colonizers or foreign 
invaders simply imposed in a top-down approach. Instead, competing factions, 
intellectuals, and citizens constantly played tugs-of-war in which their differing versions 
and interpretations of modernity came into conflict and helped shape the national 
discourse on what modernity was and ought to be. It is important to carefully examine the 
use of terms like colonialism and modernity when describing Asian history because if 
used in the original, U.S.-centric context, the terms may “end up bearing little relation to 
local, anti-imperialist nationalist historiographies of the work of critical historians 
working in the regions in question, and against state-sponsored or crudely nationalist 
historiographies of their own.”9 
Therefore, the term “modernity” throughout this paper denotes the ideological 
movement within East Asia, one that East Asian elites intentionally enabled, to imitate 
the West and its supposedly superior conventions. The use of the term ‘modern’ in 
describing Japan’s history as an active colonizer “almost always erases Japan’s own 
reproduction of imperialist behavior and instead signifies the introduction of Western 
                                     
9 Tani E. Barlow, Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia. (Duke University Press, 1997) p.17. 
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thought and material goods.”10 It is important to be aware of the agency that the East 
Asian states – and their people – had in restructuring their institutions and carrying out, or 
being complicit in, organized atrocities against the “less modern” factions or populations. 
Modernity and its Eventual Devolvement into Imperialistic Violence 
The appropriation of modernity by an entity could culminate in mass violence if 
the entity were to gain first-face power. Zygmunt Bauman argues that the Holocaust was 
a culmination of modernity, and “not an antithesis of modern civilization and everything 
(or so we like to think) it stands for.”11 Many observers prefer to believe that the 
Holocaust was an aberration, one that was due to a society’s failure to prevent atrocities. 
However, the systematic nature of killings and the goal to ‘cleanse’ an ethnicity closely 
resembled the systematic means of production and industrialization that defined 
modernity in Europe. The machine-like destruction and killing of Jews and other 
minorities “was structurally no different from organized German society as a whole.”12 
Bauman notes that while “modern civilization was not the Holocaust's sufficient 
condition,” it was “most certainly its necessary condition.”13 Likewise, some of the 
factions and regimes featured in this paper used the propaganda of modernity to 
legitimize the use of violence, the elimination of “less modern” ethnicities, and the 
expansion of their territories. However, such devolvement into large-scale violence was 
only possible for entities that had first-face power in addition to third-face power.  
 
                                     
10 Deidre Lynch and William Beatty Warner. Cultural Institutions of the Novel. (Duke University Press, 
1996) p.231 
11 Zygmunt Bauman. Modernity and the Holocaust. (Hoboken: Wiley, 2013) p.7 
12 Bauman, p.9. 
13 Bauman, p.31. 
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CASE STUDY 1: FACTIONAL CONFLICTS IN JAPAN 
Introduction  
This chapter explores the evolution of the modernity discourse in Japan in the 19th and 
early 20th centuries. The emergence of threats from the “West,” such as Commodore Perry’s 
opening of Japan, and internal instability due to inefficiencies of the feudal order led to calls for 
modernization by a group of samurais. Following the overthrow of the feudal government and 
establishment of the Japanese modern nation-state, also known as the Meiji Restoration, the 
ruling regime and pro-modernization intellectuals instituted second-face and third-face forms of 
control through language policy changes and the implementation of public education.  
Following centuries of warring states, Japan had become a decentralized feudal state 
consisting of the bakufu and daimyo by the 17th century. The bakufu referred to the government 
of a Shōgun, and a Shōgun was a hereditary military commander. The daimyo were landholding 
military lords who used the samurai class to fight over territory for centuries, and each daimyo 
reigned over a domain. The Tokugawa family had brought hundreds of daimyo under control in 
1603, and the daimyo gradually lost political power as the bakufu increased its control over the 
daimyo and their governance. By the time the Emperor abolished the bakufu, the daimyo were 
merely figureheads with little military or political power.   
Emergence of Foreign Threats 
The decentralized system of the bakufu and the daimyo brought about peace in Japan, as 
it reduced the number of internal conflicts, but it had not prepared Japan against foreign threats. 
The Morrison incident of 1837 was the first event that alerted the Japanese regarding the 
inefficiencies of their isolationist policy. The Morrison, an American vessel, arrived at “the 
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Tokugawa bakufu’s very doorstep” in Edo Bay in the summer of 1837.14 The bakufu was able to 
drive away the vessel using gunfire, only to learn later that the vessel was attempting to 
repatriate shipwrecked Japanese citizens. Although the incident did not create major casualties, 
the Japanese ruling class began to worry that their defense capacities may not be sufficient 
against the European and American forces that frequently visited Asia for trade. These concerns 
materialized in 1843 when Great Britain signed the Treaty of Nanking with Qing China after the 
First Opium War, which granted the British the sovereignty over Hong Kong and greater rights 
to trade in China.  
Instability Due to Famine and Mass Uprisings  
The bakufu launched a series of Tempō reforms in the 1840s when famine brought about 
unrest across the country.15 Popular uprisings had become more frequent by the day across the 
country. In addition, the encounter with the Morrison and the news of Qing’s defeat in the First 
Opium War brought to the Japanese ruling class’s attention that the decentralized bakufu-daimyo 
system had left the country defenseless. The bakufu had restrained the daimyo by limiting their 
military capacity and installing a system in which the daimyo had to live at the Shōgun’s 
residence in Edo (modern-day Tokyo) for several months of the year. The daimyo also had to 
participate in costly processions to and from Edo, which placed a significant financial burden on 
the daimyo.16 This system ensured domestic stability as the daimyo could not easily rebel against 
the bakufu, but it also meant that Japan as a state did not have the military capabilities to fight 
against foreign invaders.  
                                     
14 Marius B. Jansen, The Emergence of Meiji Japan, (New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 1995) p.10. 
15 Jansen, p.10.  
16 Constantine Nomikos Vaporis. Tour of Duty: Samurai, Military Service in Edo, and the Culture of Early Modern 
Japan. 1 online resource (xii, 318 pages) : illustrations, maps vols. (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2008) 
p.64. 
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The Tempō reforms were a set of economic, cultural, and religious policies intended to 
bring about stability in the face of famines and popular grievances. The bakufu not only 
implemented price controls, but it also banned the Rangaku, or Western Learning. The daimyo 
did not welcome these overreaches from the central government. In the 1840s, the daimyo 
replaced the bakufu’s main policymaker with a more passive official, who allowed the daimyo to 
maintain a decentralized system of power under the Shōgun. A decade later when Commodore 
Perry of the U.S. forced Japan to open its doors in 1853, Japan was without a central government 
at the expense of the daimyo’s local gains.17 
Modernization of the Educational System and Japanese Identity in Meiji Japan 
In the decades leading up to the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Tokugawa Japan saw an 
emergence of Rangaku, or Western Learning, which discussed theories of political economy and 
Western sciences such as medicine, physics, and geography. The proponents of Western 
Learning, such as Honda Toshiaki, believed that Japan must abandon its isolationist policies and 
strengthen national defense to keep pace with Western advancements in technology.18 In 
response, the Tokugawa bakufu tried to restrain the growing popularity of Western Learning by 
persecuting those who studied modern sciences or Western culture.  
The Meiji Restoration of 1868 provided an opportunity to reshape the nature of education 
in Japan. The samurai class that facilitated the coup, court nobles, daimyo, and the Emperor 
himself struggled to create an interpretation of Meiji Restoration that would legitimize their 
status within the new order. The visions for education put forth by various stakeholders during 
the early Meiji era “reflected both the contest for political power and this larger struggle among 
                                     
17 Jansen, p.48. 
18 Jansen.p.117. 
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competing interpretations of the Restoration.”19 Those who advocated for Chinese education for 
the elites came into conflict with proponents of Western education or nativists wanting Shinto-
style education.  
Following the Restoration, many schools built during the Tokugawa era began to 
emphasize their devotion to the state, rather than to the local daimyo. The school in Matsumoto 
Domain, for instance, changed its mission statement to “expanding knowledge and fostering 
talent so that we may be of use to the state.”20 The changing language at many domain schools 
signaled that a growing number of local authorities were acknowledging the inevitability of 
reintegration under the Meiji government and giving up their hopes of decentralization.   
The Meiji government also implemented public schooling for the first time in Japan’s 
history. In 1869, the first modern elementary school opened as an experiment in Numazu. Nishi 
Amane, a scholar of Western Learning, played an active role in the opening of the elementary 
school. Nishi’s belief that the “government should ‘exercise jurisdiction over children’ by taking 
an active role in schooling” reflected his view of the modern state as an incubator for a strong, 
productive workforce – or potentially, an army.21 Although the Numazu elementary school ended 
up becoming a preparatory school for a nearby military academy, subsequent elementary schools 
that opened in Kyoto better embodied Nishi’s ideal, that schools should become a functioning 
part of the state apparatus. These Kyoto schools also served as “clinics for vaccination, stations 
for civil guards, and meeting places where governmental orders could be explained to the 
populace” and thereby became “a local arm of the machinery of government, one that integrated 
                                     
19 Platt, Brian. Burning and Building: Schooling and State Formation in Japan, 1750-1890. Harvard East Asian 
Monographs ; 237. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004) p.101. 
20 Platt, p.110. 
21 Platt, p.111-112. 
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the general population into the state and complemented its functions.”22 
Since the Heian era (794 AD – 1185 AD), Japanese people used kanji, or Chinese 
characters, as their classical form of writing. Mori Arinori, who was the first minister of 
education for the Meiji government, wrote in a letter to a Yale University linguist that Japan, as a 
“commercial nation,” must adopt English “in view of our rapidly increasing intercourse with the 
world at large.”23 Here, Mori did not wish to abolish the Japanese language completely to have it 
replaced by English. Mori’s main intentions were to eradicate Chinese presence from the 
language and instead have English become the new language of the learned in Japan – just as 
Latin was in European countries – because he believed the Chinese language was a hindrance to 
Japan’s modernization efforts.24 
The Japanese debate on the script for its spoken language had only become fiercer by the 
fourth decade of the Meiji government (1897 – 1906). Scholars who were ardent nationalists and 
advocates of the imperial order, such as Inoue Tetsujirō, also called for the elimination of kanji 
and creation of a new written system unique to Japanese. Inoue lamented that the language and 
thought of Japanese people were under the control of China, an inferior country, but he was also 
unhappy that romanization “does not appeal to the sentiment of the Japanese.”25 These efforts to 
free the Japanese language from foreign influences, and especially that of Chinese, were crucial 
to justifying the concept of kokutai, or Japan’s unique national identity. While the word kokugo, 
literally meaning “national language,” had long existed before the Meiji era, the connotation of 
kokugo as a superior antithesis to kango (“Chinese language”) was “a child of modernity born 
                                     
22 Platt, p.112. 
23 Yŏn-suk Yi, The Ideology of Kokugo: Nationalizing Language in Modern Japan. English-Language edition, 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2010) p.305–310. 
24 Yi, p.11. 
25 Yi, p.33. 
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out of the intense determination of Meiji Japan.”26 The Realpolitik of the First Sino-Japanese 
War and the fiercely nationalist campaign to redesign the Japanese language were mutually 
reinforcing. The hatred toward China continued to grow as a result of the military rivalry, and 
changes in the language helped reify an ideal of the unique and superior Japanese identity. The 
insistence on nationalizing the Japanese language later culminated in strict enforcement of 
kokugo in Korea and Manchuria, which will be further discussed in Case Study 3. 
Conclusion 
The nationalization of the Japanese language and implementation of public schooling not 
only reinforced the Meiji regime’s grip on second-face power, but it also reshaped the 
distribution of third-face, normative power. Through changes in the Japanese subjects’ view of 
themselves and their nation, the Meiji regime was able to propagate the idea of Imperial Japan as 
the superior nation, one that outclassed both the West and the Great Chinese Civilization. The 
production of these beliefs – and willing Japanese subjects’ consumption of such beliefs – set the 
path for Japan’s colonial conquests.  
                                     
26 Yi, p.54. 
  19 
CASE STUDY 2: ORIGINS OF MODERNITY DISCOURSE IN JOSEON KOREA 
Introduction 
Korea became a Japanese protectorate in 1905 under the Japan-Korea Treaty, also known 
as the Eulsa Treaty, and it later became a colony of Imperial Japan. This chapter seeks to refute 
the common myth that Imperial Japan, despite its injustices against the colonized Korean people, 
endowed them with the gift of modernity. Political elites and intellectuals in Joseon Korea had 
been inspired to adopt modernity as early as in the 18th century, when a group of envoys from 
the Joseon court traveled to Qing China. This chapter provides the history of pro- and anti-
modernization factions in Joseon Korea and concludes that the pro-modernization faction’s 
failure to obtain the necessary first-face power (i.e., military support from foreign allies) made 
Joseon Korea vulnerable to takeover by Imperial Japan. The competition among pro- and anti-
modernization factions did not become resolved in a timely manner, and the Korean royalty 
failed to become a modern nation-state that could respond to domestic grievances and external 
threats.  
From Foundation Myths to Northern Studies Faction: Evolution of Korean Ideologies 
The foundation myths of Korea contain elements of filial piety, hierarchical authority, 
and importance of marital relations that are also essential in Confucianism.27 The myths center 
around the Lord of Heaven, his son Hwanung, Hwanung’s wife who transforms from a bear into 
a woman, and the subordinates who live under Hwanung’s rule. These myths emphasized the 
relationships between father and son, husband and wife, ruler and subjects, which are among the 
five important tenets of Confucianism. It is likely that the native shamanistic myths later evolved 
to include Confucian ideals when the idea became popularized in ancient Korea.  
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Confucianism first entered Korea during the Three Kingdoms Era (57 BC – 668 AD), 
which consisted of Goguryeo, Baekje, and Silla vying for dominance on the peninsula. The 
kingdoms of Goguryeo and Baekje began to import Confucian ideas as they increasingly adopted 
Chinese commodities and culture in the fourth century.28 James Grayson argues that during the 
Three Kingdoms Era, Confucianism only had a cultural influence on the Korean kingdoms rather 
than political or social. That is, the Korean people adopted the Chinese writing system to better 
study Confucian works and established a formal system of education, which is a key tenet of 
Confucianism, but Confucian ideas did not affect political institutions or societal norms and 
values.29  
It was only during the Goryeo Dynasty (917 AD – 1392 AD), which resulted from the 
unification of various Korean kingdoms, that Confucianism began to have a predominant 
influence on Korea’s political institutions. Buddhism and Confucianism, both of which entered 
Korea through China, coexisted and complemented one another as they began to shape cultural, 
political, and social norms in Goryeo. Choe Seongno (927 – 89), who was a Confucian scholar of 
the Goryeo Dynasty, observed that Buddhism had a greater influence for education while 
Confucianism guided the practice of government.30  
Confucian ideals ensured a degree of transparency and accountability for government 
officials in the later Korean kingdoms. The Goryeo Dynasty and Joseon Dynasty (1392 AD – 
1897 AD) were meritocratic bureaucracies that administered examinations for government 
positions, though kingship was still hereditary. In this paper, Neo-Confucianism (성리학; 
Seonglihak) refers to the branch of Confucianism that began in the 12th century. Neo-
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Confucianism emphasized familial relations and one’s relationship with the state while denying 
the legitimacy of Daoism and Buddhism. 
Confucian Realism (실학; Silhak) started in 17th century Joseon after many scholars 
acknowledged that Neo-Confucianism failed to provide realistic solutions to human life. 
Beginning in the 17th and 18th centuries, many farmers in Joseon had to leave their land or work 
as tenant farmers for wealthy landlords as the ownership of land began concentrating among the 
wealthy few. Confucian Realists varied in their stances on this issue as some defended the 
growth of the wealthy landholding class while others sought to help farmers who lost their land. 
Confucian Realism also actively incorporated some of the Western ideas that they encountered 
via China, such as mathematics, astronomy, and cartography. The concept of Western 
monotheism, like that of Catholicism, intrigued some Confucian Realists who saw the religion as 
complementing Confucianism rather than weakening it. 
Korea’s Adoption of Modernity and Qing China’s Influence 
The Korean state had already begun the process of modernization well before the 
Japanese declared Korea its protectorate in 1905 and officially annexed Korea in 1910. As a 
peninsula stuck between the vast continent of Asia and the Japanese isles, Korea had always 
been exposed to cultural, religious, and philosophical influences from other countries. The 
Korean response to these influences and ever-changing geopolitical dynamics of Northeast Asia 
was not a monolith. In fact, variations of and conflicts between different Korean responses 
triggered tugs-of-war among the Korean people, and competing sides sometimes exploited class-
based grievances. In the late 19th century, these conflicts involved foreign armies as factions 
looked to the Qing or the Japanese for military support.  
The Joseon royalty and many of the scholar-gentry looked down on the Qing dynasty as 
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barbarians who replaced the true Chinese civilization under the Ming dynasty. Some of the 
Joseon kings even organized royal rituals for the deceased Ming emperors, risking their 
diplomatic relations with the Qing court.31 These kings and scholars believed that Joseon had the 
duty to preserve the cultural and philosophical ideas of the Great Chinese Civilization and defy 
the Qing.  
Only in the 18th century did elites who traveled to Qing as Joseon’s envoys, such as Park 
Jega, argue that Joseon had much to learn from Qing. These scholars acknowledged that even 
within the Qing dynasty, there were traces of the Great Chinese Civilization. They observed that 
agricultural development and vitalization of trade and manufacture industries allowed for Qing’s 
economic growth and improved their people’s welfare.32 Park Jega made observations about 
agricultural practices, transportation, and the market economy in Beijing in 1778 and submitted 
his recommendations to the Joseon king in 1799.33 These elites came to be known as the 
Northern Studies Faction (북학파; Bukhakpa), and they argued that Joseon should adopt the 
knowledge of the Qing Dynasty. 
Attempts at Modernization Under Gojong 
The official state-run efforts for modernization began roughly in the 1880s. The Korean 
state as an institution was an intricate hierarchy of various organs that oversaw executive, 
judicial, and administrative functions.34 The legal codes decreed during Gojong’s reign (1864 – 
1907) showcase these transformations. The last revision to the Korean dynasty’s legal code 
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during the Joseon dynasty, the Daejeon hoetong of 1865, did not show many deviations from the 
original dynastic code Gyeongguk daejeon from 1471.35 The state institutions began to have 
significant changes in the 1880s, however, as the monarch established the Tongni amun agencies.  
The Tongni amun agencies resembled the governmental agencies of the Qing dynasty and 
signaled to foreign states that Joseon was finally willing to open its doors to Western culture and 
trade goods. Modernization efforts had already begun in Korea before the Japanese began to 
tighten their control in 1905 and officially annexed the peninsula in 1910. These efforts for 
modernization took inspiration from Western and Japanese philosophies, and they were not quite 
successful or widespread in their implementation. Yet these efforts under the Korean royalty 
signaled a shift from the feudal rule of the Joseon era to a modernized monarchy, in which the 
state could hopefully respond to changes in the international order.  
Ideological Conflicts Among Enlightenment Factions and Isolationists 
Myeongseong and her relatives planned to gradually modernize Joseon in an admiration 
for the Qing, and historians today refer to their faction as the Moderate Enlightenment Faction. 
The pro-Japanese members of the Enlightenment Faction, on the other hand, constitute the 
Radical Enlightenment Faction. The pro-Japanese Radical Enlightenment Faction was able to 
crowd out the pro-Qing Moderate Enlightenment Faction under Myeongseong, largely because 
Japan had greater military might at the time. Power in the realist sense may ultimately determine 
who wins over the physical space, but the colonizer’s efforts to control and encroach upon the 
thoughts and ideals of the colonized rely heavily on the existing norm dynamics. Some of the 
existing schools of thought aided the spread of colonial power, like the pro-Japanese elite faction 
had, but others vigorously challenged the colonial encroachment, as will be shown in the next 
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section.  
The power struggle among various factions within the Joseon court allowed the Qing and 
Japan to gradually expand their grasp over the Korean Peninsula. Daewongun, who was 
dethroned in 1873, still had communications with members of the Isolationist Faction, which 
resisted acknowledging Qing as a legitimate power. The Isolationists believed that even Qing 
and the Western countries consisted of barbarians and “animals,” while Joseon was the only 
remaining land for humanity and the descendants of the Great Chinese Civilization.36  
Daewongun and the Isolationist Faction strongly opposed opening doors to Western or 
Japanese influences. In contrast, elites from the Northern Studies Faction such as Park Gyu-su 
argued that Joseon must also begin adopting foreign ideas, and they formed the Enlightenment 
Faction, that called for civilizing and modernizing Joseon. The Enlightenment Faction of Joseon 
had accurately observed the changes in the geopolitical distribution of power when Great Britain 
defeated Qing in the First and Second Opium Wars. The humiliating defeat of Qing came as a 
shock for these scholars who believed the Qing military to have the most sophisticated 
technology in the world.37  
In 1882, Daewongun decided to exploit the grievances of soldiers who received defective 
rice (rice mixed with sand) in lieu of proper compensation. Daewongun promised the soldiers 
proper payment and mobilized them to attack the capital. The soldiers’ attempt to assassinate 
Myeongseong, who had taken over the throne after deposing her father-in-law Daewongun, 
failed as she escaped in time. Nonetheless, Gojong, who was Daewongun’s son and 
Myeongseong’s husband, had little choice but to accept Daewongun’s return to the throne. 
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Guarded by a squad of 200 soldiers that participated in the uprising, Daewongun swiftly 
abolished the Tongni amun agencies. Myeongseong in her refuge requested military assistance 
from Qing. Although Japan had also sent in its own army, Qing troops outnumbered and 
outpaced the Japanese in their response to the uprising and removed Daewongun.   
The Radical Enlightenment Faction organized the 1884 Gapsin Coup and killed several 
pro-Qing members of the court, who were mostly Myeongseong’s relatives. Myeongseong, who 
again survived the uprising, called for help from the Qing and returned to her throne. The support 
for the Radical Enlightenment Faction was weak at the time, and the proponents mainly 
consisted of Confucian scholars and a handful of diplomats.  
Donghak and Pro-Japanese Populist Collaborators  
Donghak began in 1860 as a Neo-Confucian religion that combined Confucian ethics and 
Western monotheism with local traditional shamanism and spiritual beliefs. The name Donghak, 
meaning the study of the east, suggested that Donghak protected Joseon while Catholicism 
protected the West.38 Donghak gave hope to many farmers and commoners who had growing 
grievances against the inequalities of the feudal system. The religion taught its people that 
Hanullim (한울님), or God, existed within every person and that every person deserved to be 
treated and respected like God.39 Such calls for egalitarianism appealed to the powerless farming 
class while threatening the stability of the feudal ruling class, leading to executions of the 
religious leaders of Donghak. 
The 1894 Donghak Uprising prompted the Joseon monarchy – ruled at the time by 
Myeongseong,40 Joseon’s queen, and her relatives – to request military assistance from Qing’s 
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Yuan Shikai. As Qing deployed troops, Japan rushed its troops to the peninsula. The rivalries 
between China and Japan intensified and culminated in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-
1895). Ilchinhoe, a group of pro-Japanese collaborators, actively assisted Japan as it battled the 
Qing dynasty. The primary leaders of Donghak, who also happened to constitute the majority of 
pro-Japanese Ilchinhoe, believed that Koreans must look to Japan as an exemplar for modern 
development.  
The pro-Japanese Ilchinhoe collaborators were populist, and they appealed to the masses 
by refusing to pay taxes.41 The Ilchinhoe drew a stark contrast from the collaborators under Yi 
Wang-yong, who were “privileged aristocrats within the pro-Japanese cabinet under the 
protectorate.”42 According to a 1904 survey of Ilchinhoe members, more than 50 percent had 
self-identified as former officials or literati, while the rest identified as lower-class. It is likely 
that these former officials and literati experienced alienation under the inefficient, corrupt 
bureaucracies of Joseon and decided to mobilize the masses in their protest against the 
monarchial establishment.43 Ilchinhoe continued to put forth populist rhetoric until the 
Annexation in 1910, such as by calling for the redistribution of tenant rights and control of 
public lands.  
Japan’s ambitions to modernize the Korean Peninsula and expand its control throughout 
Asia – based on a universalist perception of its own identity – were reinforced by the active 
support of populist Korean collaborators. Despite the one-dimensional depiction of these 
collaborators in today’s history as simply opportunistic and greedy, it appears that the elite 
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leaders of Ilchinhoe, the Enlightenment Faction, and Donghak did emphasize a message of 
egalitarianism and decried the corruption of the monarchial establishment. Although it is nearly 
impossible to gauge whether their egalitarian concerns for the people were authentic, it is 
important to note that the Korean masses’ grievances against the unequal feudal structure had 
been brewing enough to the point that populist collaborators could exploit them.  
Confrontations with Western Powers and Joseon Responses 
Members of the Joseon court increasingly voiced their fears that Western powers could 
threaten Joseon’s existence, as they watched Qing and Japan open doors to European forces and 
the U.S. in the late 19th century. Yet these fears failed to materialize into modernization policy, 
and the state merely repaired some of its old weaponry. Prior to 1866, when Joseon had its first 
military conflict with a European country, the royalty and elites of the Joseon court merely 
reported the occasional appearances of Western boats to Qing, and the perception that Joseon 
had to fundamentally change its diplomatic policies toward the West was largely absent.44  
The 1866 French attack on Korea and 1871 U.S. attack on Korea proved to a few 
concerned elites the urgent need for modernization, while Daewongun still refused to open 
Joseon’s doors and improve its military capabilities. Daewongun had briefly considered forming 
diplomatic ties with France in 1860, given his wife’s devout beliefs in Catholicism, but the 
diplomatic attempts dissipated as he quickly changed his mind. As European influence in Asia 
began to grow, Daewongun decided to persecute Catholics in Joseon and executed a French 
priest in 1866. France took this as an opportunity to invade Joseon, but the French had to retreat, 
in a rare instance of an agricultural pre-modern state defeating an industrialized nation in a 
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battle.45 
The United States army invaded Joseon in 1871 for numerous reasons, one of which was 
to further investigate why Joseon soldiers shot an American armed merchant steamer several 
years earlier. The U.S. was far better prepared than the French and succeeded in killing over 200 
Korean troops with only a few American casualties. Nonetheless, Daewongun refused to open 
Joseon’s doors to the U.S., and the American troops retreated. Although a few scholars like Park 
Gyu-su worried that Joseon needed to modernize and open its doors to the west if it were to 
survive, Daewongun falsely interpreted Joseon’s “victories” in both incidents as proof of its 
military strength and continued the isolationist policies.  
Proponents of Dongdoseogiron (Eastern Ideals and Western Technology Theory; 
동도서기론), which emerged in the 1880s, argued that Joseon must simultaneously preserve the 
Confucian ideals of the Great Chinese Civilization and adopt the modern technological 
advancements of the West. Many scholars see Dongdoseogiron as an early form of the 
Enlightenment ideology because it signaled a radical departure from the ideas of 
Wijeongcheoksaron (Defending Joseon and Eradicating the Evil Theory; 위정척사론).46 
Wijeongcheoksaron was the idea that Joseon must protect Neo-Confucian ideals while 
eliminating the “evil studies (사학; 邪學)” of the West. The evil studies referred to any 
philosophical or cultural concepts brought in from the West, such as Catholicism.  
Park Gyu-su began to defy the Confucian concept of binary delineation between the 
Chinese civilization (화; 華) and the barbarians (이; 夷) in the 1870s, after the 1871 U.S. attack 
                                     
45 Wonmo Kim 김원모, “Byeongin yangyo” 병인양요 [Byeongin Western Invasion] Encyclopedia of Korean 
Culture 한국민족문화대백과사전, 1995. Accessed December 22, 2018. 
http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Contents/Item/E0023142.  
46 Sin-jae Kim 金信在, “Bakgyusuui gaehwasasangui seonggyeok” 박규수의 개화사상의 성격 [Character of the 
Enlightenment Idea of Park Gyu Su] The Kyoung-ju Sahak 경주사학 19 (2000) p.199-200. 
  29 
on Korea. The Enlightenment Faction argued for adopting the ideology and norms of the 
Western states, while also implementing capitalistic means of production to strengthen Joseon 
militarily and ensure its prosperity.47 One could categorize Park Gyu-su’s openness to Western 
technology and deference to Confucian ideals as an embodiment of Dongdoseogiron.  
Japan forced an unequal treaty with Joseon in 1876 through the Ganghwa Island Treaty. 
The treaty came at a time before the Enlightenment Faction had become popular with the masses, 
and Confucian scholars and the general population expressed opposition to opening Joseon’s 
doors to Japan. Even Joseon’s first official diplomat to Japan at the time doubted that Japan’s 
rapid modernization efforts would be successful.48  
Japan’s infiltration into Joseon through the 1876 Ganghwa Island Treaty shocked 
Hongzhang Li, the viceroy of Zhili province at the time. Li rushed to have Qing diplomats in 
Japan meet with Joseon’s diplomat and persuade him to adopt the Theory of Diplomacy with the 
U.S (연미론; 聯美論). The theory called for “maintaining friendly relations with China, 
breaking ties with Japan, and developing diplomatic relations with the U.S. (친중국 결일본 
연미국)” as a means to defend Joseon against the increasing threat of Russia.49    
Kang Wi, a Joseon poet and scholar who aided the state in negotiating the Ganghwa 
Island Treaty with Japan, revised this theory to better suit Joseon’s unique security needs. Kang 
Wi believed that unlike Qing, Joseon could easily form diplomatic ties with Russia because 
Joseon did not face an imminent threat of attacks from Russia. Nonetheless, partly due to his 
belief that the U.S. was a land of equality and peace, Kang Wi ultimately concluded that an 
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alliance with the U.S. was strategically a better choice. He also correctly identified Americans’ 
fear of a Russian hegemony in the Asia-Pacific and informed Gojong that the U.S. likely has a 
genuine interest in forming ties with Joseon.50 Surely, less than a century later, the U.S. would go 
to war against the Soviet Union in the name of preventing a communist takeover of Asia. 
Conclusion 
The decision to modernize Joseon was on the basis of both Realpolitik and ideological 
commitments to the Great Chinese Civilization. The factions that prevented Joseon from 
properly responding to changes in the geopolitical power distribution – namely the 
modernization of Japan and the arrival of Western countries – had selfish interests in maintaining 
their political clout. In addition, Joseon Isolationists’ stubborn adherence to Neo-Confucian 
ideology and superiority of the Great Chinese Civilization (中華) in a binary sense blinded 
Daewongun from properly responding to changes in the geopolitical power distribution. The 
obsession with the dichotomy between the civilized and the barbarians prevented the Joseon 
court from swiftly adapting to the changing times.  
Both Japan and Korea had experienced popular uprisings that were largely provoked by 
the inefficiency of the state, in the 19th century. Yet the Japanese state responded by promptly 
undergoing the Meiji Restoration and establishing a centralized monarchy, approaching one step 
closer to the imperial military state that it became in the early 20th century. Korea, on the other 
hand, failed to modernize itself in time due to the power struggles among factions within the 
Joseon court and many elites’ pious attachment to the Great Chinese Civilization.  
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CASE STUDY 3: JAPAN’S IMPERIAL CONQUESTS 
Introduction 
This chapter explores Japan’s use of modernity as propaganda and its imperial pursuits in 
Korea and Manchuria. Japan’s desire to become a “modern” state and expand its territory was 
rooted in its inferiority complex toward the West and the Great Chinese Civilization. In addition 
to reshaping the Japanese subjects’ view of self and of their nation with language and education 
policies, as discussed in Case Study 1, the ruling regime of Japan sought to prove its superiority 
in the Asia-Pacific region by conquering Korea. It also launched the project of building a 
multiethnic utopia in Manchuria, which was a symbolic representation of Imperial Japan’s power 
and generosity as the colonizer but was in fact fraught with colonial forms of oppression.  
Inferiority Complex toward the West and China 
Japan’s colonial conquests are a response to its own inferiority complex, or the “deep-
rooted anxiety/inferiority caused by the historical encounter with the Christian civilization.”51 
Japan during the Meiji Restoration period best exemplified collective learning, during which 
“political leaders and intellectuals aggressively copied institutional designs, lifestyles, and 
continental philosophies from Europe.”52 At the same time, Japan’s attempts to imitate the West 
were coupled with a desire to outperform China and overcome China’s ideological superiority. In 
Japan’s conception of self, the quest to become more “Western” had replaced Sinology, or an 
admiration for China’s cultural and ideological authority. 
Japan’s continuing struggle to “present its in-between ambivalence towards the binary 
world of the Orient versus the Occidental” became apparent in its conquest of Manchuria, a 
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region that spans Northeast China and parts of Mongolia.53 Japan attempted to redefine its 
identity as a state that is neither the East nor West but is able to bridge the civilizations. Yet this 
attempt relied on an assumption that “the East and West must be ontologically distinct from each 
other, necessarily remaining on opposite sides of the bridge.”54 Therefore, in order to fulfill this 
perception of self, Japan had to create and reinforce a worldview in which all other Asian 
ethnicities were inferior to the Japanese and the superior West was within Japan’s reach. 
Pan-Asianism and Ethnic Superiority as Foundation for Japan’s Colonial Conquests 
The concept of Pan-Asianism emerged in the late 19th century and early 20th century in 
response to Japan’s first encounter with the West. In the 1920s, the perception of China as “‘not 
a state but merely a civilization’” and a justification that since it is “‘merely a civilization, it has 
no clearly delineated political borders,’ [made] inroads into Japanese logic to justify expansion 
and territorial conquest in China.”55 
The increasing clout of European countries and their diplomatic partnerships with Asian 
nations, such as Korea, threatened Japan’s ambition to attain hegemony in the region. The 
diplomatic partnerships that European countries formed with Korea were more of a tributary, 
hierarchical relationship that Korea had had for millennia with China than a mutually beneficial 
alliance. In response, Kōa-kai, the first official organization in Japan dedicated to the cause of 
Asianism, vowed to “promote cooperation among the various nations of Asia, starting first and 
foremost with China and Korea, and thereby reverse the decline, resist the West, and advance 
Asian interests.”56 
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The Paris Peace Conference in January of 1919 marked the rise of a new great power – 
and the first non-European, non-American one at that – as Japan joined the Council of Ten as 
one of the key decision-making powers. Yet two months later, in March 1919, the terms of the 
Council were revised so that “the decision-making power had shifted to the Council of Four, 
which consisted of the political leaders of the four great powers [United States, Britain, Italy, and 
France], excluding Japan,” possibly due to Japan’s proposal to “insert a racial equality clause 
into the Covenant of the League of Nations.”57 
The Japanese leaders’ calls for racial equality within the League of Nations did not reflect 
a genuine concern for equal rights for all races and ethnicities. Japanese intellectuals, such as the 
likes of Ishibashi Tanzan, criticized the Japanese government for “wanting equal status with the 
[European and American] powers, but conducting discriminatory and imperial policies towards 
‘other’ Asians.”58 Yet, this was precisely why racial discrimination from the Euro-American 
powers was especially insulting for the Japanese leaders and public. The Japanese refused to be 
perceived as equal to the other, inferior Asians. 
Colonial Policies in Okinawa 
Alan Christy found the roots of Japanese colonialism in Japan’s early discriminatory 
policies toward Okinawans. The people of Okinawa, whom Japan decided to exclude from its 
newly defined national identity, “suffered the same ‘military invasion and occupation, political 
annexation, paternalistic enforcement of modernization, and compulsory cultural (especially 
linguistic) assimilation to Japan that were the hallmarks of Japanese colonial policy throughout 
Asia.”59 
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Japan’s colonial treatment of Okinawan identity vis-à-vis the supposed “Japaneseness” 
mirrors that of Korean identity. During the Meiji era, the Japanese government successfully 
constructed “Japanese identity […] as the sign of a progressive, non-Okinawan identity, while 
Okinawan identity was produced as a sign of being antimodern and non-Japanese.”60 Creating a 
dichotomy between a superior ethnicity and an inferior one legitimized discrimination against 
individuals who, according to the Japanese state, belonged to the inferior group. These early 
constructions of the Okinawan as the “antimodern” Other evolved into Japan’s colonial policies 
in Korea and Manchuria.   
Colonial Policies in Korea 
Lee et al (2013) classified colonial spaces into three types, namely the Colonial 
Superstructural Space (CSuS), Colonial Functional Space (CFS), and the Colonial Social Space 
(CSS). CSuS refers to any space in which the colonizer attempts to establish its hegemony, and it 
need not be a physical entity. CSuS includes Imperial Japan's policy of requiring Koreans to use 
Japanese names and any bureaucracies that support such legal measures.61 CFS, on the other 
hand, involve actions or institutions that enable the economic exploitation of the colonized. The 
elements that belong to CFS are often directly imported from the colonizing country, such as 
modern educational and healthcare institutions. These seemingly benign institutions' main 
purpose is not to improve the well-being of the colonized; rather, it is to expedite and streamline 
the colonizer's exploitation of colonial resources.62 CSS, then, refers to the space that is least 
controlled by the colonizer, and often so because the minimal control is beneficial for the 
colonizer. For instance, the Japanese left the Korean traditional family structure intact because it 
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allowed for easier management of the colonized people. 
Imperial Japan sought to expand its hegemony with heavy policing of the colonized 
peoples, and it also actively promoted the idea of Japanese ethnic superiority via name changes. 
It also established public schooling where Korean children studied in the Japanese language, and 
hospitals and vaccination became widely implemented across the colony. Schools were a 
convenient tool for spreading the propaganda of Japanese ethnic superiority, and Japanese 
officials frequently emphasized the lack of modern healthcare in Colonial Korea to justify its 
occupation. Education and healthcare also helped create a strong, cheap labor force for Japanese 
businesses and the state. Lastly, Imperial Japan exploited the existing Confucian patriarchy and 
class-based social hierarchy to help with its recruitment of young men into the Japanese military 
and women as sex slaves for its troops. Imperial Japan did not attempt to remove these social 
traditions, which are a form of third-face power, because they helped further Japan's military 
hegemony and expedited its resource exploitation, which expanded its power in the first face.  
Japan used militarization to gain physical control of the people and land and to expand its 
region even further. Japan used cultural domination to ascertain its normative and ideological 
control of the colonized. The militarization of colonial subjects, not only in Korea but in Taiwan, 
Manchuria, and Okinawa, supported Japan’s ambitions to transcend borders and universalize its 
identity throughout Asia.  
The Japanese residents who had moved into Korea in the early years of the protectorate 
had also strongly demanded for a consular police force. Japanese resident communities had 
developed in port cities such as Busan, Wonsan, and Incheon after Japan had Joseon sign an 
unequal treaty and open its ports to Japanese traders. The port cities like Busan were notorious 
for petty crimes like burglary, prostitution, and drug trafficking, and the Japanese Residents' 
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Association in Busan was the first to send a request to Tokyo for consular police forces.63 
Imperial Japan also established police forces throughout the Korean Peninsula years before it 
officially occupied the country in 1910. In fact, the consular police forces that it deployed in the 
years between 1902 and 1905 helped set the ground for its military control of not only Korea, but 
also of Manchuria and the China proper.64  
These consular police forces also helped establish hospitals that were open to all local 
residents, both Japanese and Korean, in the 1880s before Japan had even occupied the 
peninsula.65 Such use of police forces for both maintaining public order and implementing 
modern healthcare shows that CSuS and CFS often overlap. Inoue Kaoru, who was Japan's 
Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1885, commented that year that the Korean people will be able 
to see the efficacy and superiority of modern Japanese medicine when they visit these port 
hospitals set up by the consular police.66  
The Deceitful Ideology of Utopian Manchukuo and Imperial Modernity 
Imperial Japan created a fictitious utopian portrayal of Manchukuo, or the Republic of 
Manchuria, to justify its territorial expansion and colonial governance. Around the time of the 
Mukden Incident of 1931, which set the pretext for Japan’s invasion of Manchuria, the 
Manchuria Youth Association put forth ideals of “harmonious cooperation of all ethnicities 
(민족협화)” and “the theory of kingly way (왕도주의)” as the basis for founding Manchukuo. 
The Manchuria Youth Association consisted of Japanese citizens living in Manchuria. These 
ideals were too vague in their essence and did not materialize into actual policies. Instead, these 
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founding ideologies of Manchukuo legitimized Japan’s expansionism and became the means for 
unifying the diverse peoples of Manchuria and obtaining their allegiance.67 
The messaging of the Manchuria Youth Association changed to the “harmonious 
cooperation of five ethnicities (오족협화),” which now centered around the Japanese ethnicity 
and placed other minorities at the periphery. This shift in narrative occurred shortly after the 
Mukden Incident because the Japanese army’s victory quelled the Japanese-Manchurians’ fear of 
Chinese dominance in the region.68 The Japanese-Manchurians previously viewed themselves as 
one of many minority ethnicities in the region, under the threat of Qing, and thus argued for the 
harmonious, relatively egalitarian cooperation of all peoples. Following the Mukden Incident, 
however, they redefined their identity as the superior ethnicity and narrowed the terms of 
cooperation to the five primary ethnicities, namely the Japanese, Koreans, Han Chinese, 
Mongolians, and Manchurians.69  
Scholars Bruce Cumings and Carter Eckert viewed the role of Manchuria as that of the 
periphery, which provided raw materials and cheap labor for the core and the semi-periphery. 
The interpretation is based on Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory, which defines 
colonial relationships as a set of interactions among the core, the semi-periphery, and the 
periphery.70 The core is generally the developed, fully industrialized nation that has the 
sophisticated technology for turning raw materials into commercial goods. The periphery usually 
constitutes colonies that supply an abundance of cheap labor and raw materials. The semi-
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periphery, then, refers to countries that are in the process of industrialization and provide both 
cheap labor and export goods. Cumings observed that “as Korean rice was shipped to Japan, 
millet was imported from Manchuria to feed Korean peasants in a classic core-semiperiphery-
periphery relationship.”71 Eckert similarly viewed the founding of Manchukuo as “greatly 
[expanding] both the actual and potential periphery of Japan’s empire” and reaffirming “Korea’s 
role as a burgeoning semi-industrial country within the imperial system.”72 Whereas Korean 
workers in the peninsula provided unskilled or semi-skilled labor in the textile industry, migrant 
laborers in Manchuria procured raw materials, such as cotton and coal, according to Eckert’s 
findings. 
The founding of Kenkoku University furthered Manchukuo’s function as the periphery 
and education as an essential part of the modern state apparatus. Kenkoku (meaning “founding of 
the nation”) University opened in Manchukuo in May of 1938 with the inaugural class of 
roughly 1300 students. The University took care to admit students of various ethnicities to 
practice its mission statement of “harmonious cooperation of the five ethnicities.” Among them, 
90 students were ethnic Koreans, who constituted about 7% of the inaugural class. The 
University was founded with the mission of cultivating the best talents into the new leaders of 
Manchukuo, and many of its Korean graduates returned to the peninsula to become leading 
figures in the military, politics, business, and academia.73 The tuition for the University was free, 
and several students had come from lower-class families or had criminal charges from 
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demonstrating against Imperial Japan; a few others belonged to elite families whose relatives 
were members of the Japanese army.74 Many Korean and Taiwanese graduates expressed their 
frustrations of growing up as colonial subjects, and they had applied to the University in hopes 
that discrimination would be less severe in Manchukuo.75 
Many scholars of Manchuria have questioned whether Manchukuo truly functioned as a 
periphery in the Wallerstein sense, as he focused on the ‘bubble’ of the Manchurian dream that 
Imperial Japan worked hard to create. The economic returns from Japan’s investment in 
Manchuria depended heavily on the Japanese and colonized people’s interest in the region. 
Newspapers in Colonial Korea ran stories about the hopeful future in the newly established 
Republic of Manchuria, and tens of thousands of merchants and students rushed to buy their train 
tickets in the first couple years of the Republic. Hundreds of women lined up for 20 job openings 
at a department store in Manchuria, and brokers recruited prostitutes and geishas on the streets of 
Busan.76  
However, despite the apparent fervor for the new frontier, not many enterprises from 
Colonial Korea relocated to Manchuria to take advantage of the cheap labor and raw materials, 
partly due to high tariffs.77 Han observed that Manchukuo was an industrialized nation, rather 
than a provider of raw materials, as 51% of its gross production came from manufacturing. Most 
importantly, Manchukuo did not necessarily fall below Colonial Korea in terms of its 
developmental and ideological superiority. Although it was short-lived, Manchukuo was 
nonetheless an independent republic whereas the Korean peninsula was a colony under strict 
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control of the imperial government. Unlike Koreans in the peninsula who did not have rights to 
self-expression, those in Manchuria lived under an ideal of multiethnic cooperation, even if it 
was a pretense. 
Baek Seok,78 a Korean poet and ardent critic of Imperial Japan, was among those who 
relocated to Manchukuo in the hopes of escaping colonial modernity. In 1939 when Baek Seok 
decided to relocate, the colonial suppression of cultural and literary expressions was at its worst. 
Following its victory at the Battle of Wuhan in 1938, Imperial Japan had become more confident 
than ever and intensified its control over colonial subjects. The project to completely eradicate 
the Korean language in schools and mass literature greatly distressed anticolonial writers at the 
time.79 Baek Seok imagined Manchuria to be a pre-modern utopia where nomads maintained an 
ancient, primal lifestyle that Koreans had long abandoned thousands of years ago. Baek Seok had 
critiqued the defects of modernity for many years, and his 1940 poem “In the Northern Lands” 
reveals his fantasy of Manchuria as the pre-modern utopia as he regrets missing out on the 
beauties of nature.80  
However, upon arrival in Manchukuo, Baek Seok soon encountered the reality of ethnic 
discrimination despite its mission of multiethnic harmony. He decided to move completely out of 
Imperial Japan’s boundaries by becoming a farmer in rural Manchuria. There the poet formed a 
symbiotic relationship with a Chinese farmer, whom he describes as the historical resident of the 
northern lands and Manchuria’s rightful owner. This friendship was an intentional act of defiance 
against Imperial Japan’s colonial policies in Manchukuo, which privileged Koreans as 
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“civilized” or “salvageable” and deemed the Chinese as barbarians.81 Therefore, Baek Seok’s 
perception of his Korean identity did not originate from a nationalistic pride, but rather he 
believed that solidarity among the colonized peoples could overcome historical grievances and 
linguistic differences, as he did with his Chinese farmer friend.  
When he witnessed a series of trains carrying Manchurian timber to markets in 
Manchukuo and overseas, however, Baek Seok lamented that imperial modernity had infiltrated 
even the most rural and uninhabited corners of Manchuria. Baek Seok’s poetry and memoirs 
from Manchuria provide a poignant critique of imperial modernity, the divisions it created 
among the Asian ethnicities, and its destruction of the pastoral lifestyle and the environment. 
Conclusion 
For Imperial Japan, Manchuria represented the transcendence of physical barriers that 
was made possible by its militaristic modern state. Japan’s success in the invasion of Manchuria 
was further proof of its supposed ethnic and ideological superiority over Korea, Taiwan, and 
even the Great Chinese Civilization. The colonial policies in Korea helped mobilize normative 
support for Imperial Japan through language and education policies, and it also helped mobilize 
the necessary manpower and resources from Korea to Manchuria. The fictitious ideology that 
Imperial Japan created to legitimize and facilitate its expansion gave false hope to working-class 
Koreans, who found themselves in double marginalization – under the unequal social hierarchy 
that still remained from Joseon era, and also under the ethnic discrimination of the colonial 
government.82 These Koreans relocated in the hopes of cultivating a peaceful rural livelihood in 
the Manchurian utopia, but instead, they inadvertently reinforced Imperial Japan’s colonial 
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projects. As Cumings and Eckert pointed out, the Korean migrants in Manchuria provided the 
much-needed labor and allowed Imperial Japan to expand its periphery. In addition, by buying 
into Imperial Japan’s deceitful ideology, the Koreans in Manchuria gave force to an otherwise 
empty rhetoric of “harmonious cooperation.” Nonetheless, for a select number of elite university 
graduates, the Republic of Manchukuo represented a grey area between the colonizer and the 
colonized, where Koreans could attempt to realize their aspirations as equal citizens and never 
quite achieve it.
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CASE STUDY 4: IDEOLOGICAL DIVERGENCES IN COLONIAL KOREA 
Introduction 
This chapter studies two vastly different interpretations of modernity that colonial 
intellectuals in Korea produced. Yi Gwangsu, a writer and intellectual who once fought for 
Korea’s liberation, later argued that Koreans were a backward, barbarian people who needed to 
improve and modify their consciousness. Korean socialists like Kim Myeong-shik and Yoo Jin-
hui believed that socialism was the ideology that would liberate the Korean people from Imperial 
Japan. Both interpretations appropriated the “empty vessel” of modernity and used the rhetorical 
appeal of modernity to further their own worldviews.  
Yi Gwangsu and the “Renovation of National Consciousness” 
Yi Gwangsu was among the prominent independence activists who later conceded to 
Imperial Japan’s ideology of modernization even at the expense of national liberation. Yi had 
been born into a lower-class peasant family, but he left Korea to study in Japan in 1905 as a 
member of a pro-Japan association named Ilchinhoe.  
Yi’s literary works from as early as 1909 exemplified his idealization of Japan as the 
model for modernization.83 The short story that Yi published in 1909 in Japan, “Is This Love,” 
tells the story of a male Joseon (Korean) student falling in love with a male Japanese student. 
While the story marks an important milestone in Korea’s literary history with its portrayal of 
queer characters, critics have also interpreted the symbolism of the story as romanticization of 
Japan's recent success in modernization. 
Despite such literary expressions of his admiration for Japan, in 1919, Yi authored the 
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February 8 Independence Declaration, which called on the United States and Britain, “the 
masters of world reform,” to condemn Imperial Japan’s subjugation of the Korean people.84 Yi 
then defected to Shanghai and joined the Provisional Government, where he served as the editor-
in-chief of Independence Newspaper. Tae-jeong Ahn interprets these activities as proof that Yi 
genuinely believed in the legitimacy of modernization under national autonomy during this 
period. It is also possible, however, that Yi was opportunistic in his decision to align himself 
with the liberation activists during this time, especially given the nationwide popular support that 
the 3.1 movement of 1919 had garnered.  
Yi used his position as one of the better-known writers among the Korean masses to 
reshape the narrative regarding the liberation movement and privilege his own views as a 
proponent of modernization. After his abandonment of the Provisional Government, Yi even 
went on to deride the 3.1 movement as “the changes made without consciousness by an ignorant, 
barbaric people,” which was the very movement that he had helped catalyze by writing the 
February 8 Independence Declaration.85 He adopted a rhetoric that closely resembled Imperial 
Japan’s justification for implementing repressive social policies. Yi advocated the ban on using 
the Korean language and argued that the Korean people’s “blood and flesh and bones must 
become Japanese” in an editorial written in September of 1940.86 Imperial Japan had relied on 
such bans to restrict the political participation of the Korean people by repressing the oppressed 
group’s thought and speech, which constitutes manipulation of the second face of power. Yi was 
willing to sacrifice his own language if it had meant that the Korean people could finally escape 
their “barbaric” status and enhance themselves into productive members of society.  
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A common thread in Yi’s ideology from the early 1900s until his death in 1951 was his 
belief that the bourgeoisie class ought to spearhead the process of modernization, regardless of 
whether this process requires cooperation with the colonizer. In his writing titled “My 
Confessions,” which was released in 1949 and was an attempt at justifying his pro-Japanese 
actions, Yi argued that “Koreans in forced labor camps will learn manufacturing skills” and that 
“the more of our people receive industrial and military training, the greater our people’s capacity 
will be.”87 Yi’s writings and declarations constituted an effort to reshape the narrative on the 
legitimacy of Imperial Japan and the measures that it took to modernize Korea.  
A close study of Yi Gwang-su’s essay “Modifying the National Consciousness,” 
published in the journal Gaebyeok in May, 1922 reveals his beliefs in modernity as a hierarchy 
between the developed ethnicities and underdeveloped, barbaric ethnicities. The original title of 
Yi’s article is Minjok gaejoron, which roughly translates to “the theory on modifying the 
ethnicity.” The Korean term gaejo can be translated into “renovation” or “modification.” The 
Korean term minjok implies ethnic homogeneity. Because Korea was such a homogenous nation, 
this article translates Yi’s use of the word in the article into “national consciousness.” It is 
nonetheless important to note that using the term minjok implied certain ethnicities were 
inherently, and perhaps even biologically, superior to others. In fact, Yi describes in this article 
various characteristics associated with different ethnic groups, such as the independent and 
practical spirit of the Anglo-Saxon people and the intellectual and collective nature of the 
German people.88 Here, Yi seems to conflate ethnic and racial categories with nationalities and 
assume that other nation-states are just as ethnically homogenous as Korea (or at least, what 
                                     
87 Ahn 안태정, p.170. 
88Yikhyeon Choi, et al., trans. Joomyeong Yi 최익현 외 지음 이주명 편역, “Wonmun saryoro ingneun hanguk 
geundaesa” 원문 사료로 읽는 한국 근대사 [Korea’s modern history read through original historical documents] 
(Seoul: Pilmaek 필맥, 2014) p.232. 
  46 
liberated Korea would look like) and Japan. Despite such inaccuracies in Yi’s understanding of 
ethnic distributions and the unreliable nature of his generalizations, such descriptions show that 
Yi believed the Korean people could improve such “ethnic” or “national consciousness” to 
become more modern in their disposition.  
Yi emphasized the people’s agency in the process of modifying the national 
consciousness. The newly found awareness exemplified in the Korean liberation movement was 
not an example of such agency. Yi argued that those changes are as natural as chemical reactions 
and compared them to “changes that an ignorant, barbaric people pursues without self-
awareness.”89 Although Yi used metaphors to soften his criticisms of the Korean people, in 
essence he had called the Korean people a barbaric, premodern ethnicity. Yi believed that a true, 
meaningful modification of the national consciousness only came about as a result of collective, 
purposeful mobilization, and the Meiji Restoration was one of its successful examples that he 
cited.90 Yi also praised the British Constitution as the epitome of practicality, and he argued that 
the British laws were superior to those of China because the Chinese laws were antiquated and 
not usable in the modern day.91 Yi therefore defined modernity as adaptability to changing times 
and practicality, and this definition of modernity legitimized colonization as a means to spread 
the practical spirit to premodern people. Yi even went on to praise Britain’s colonization of 
Egypt and the Philippines as a mutually beneficial project that allowed freedoms to the colonized 
while bringing about material gains to the colonizer. Yi attributed such successes to the British 
people’s character and their spirit of practicality and independence.92 As a collaborator with 
Imperial Japan, it was important for Yi to find the cause for the Korean people’s sufferings in the 
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flawed consciousness of the Koreans, and not in Imperial Japan’s colonization. Yi’s conclusion 
that the Korean people’s prosperity urgently requires the modification of national spirit, and not 
the liberation from Imperial Japan, thus served his personal interests as a collaborator. It also 
created a version of modernity that viewed certain ethnicities like the Japanese and the British as 
having better characters that allowed for their rise to political and military dominance. This view 
of modernity silenced the discourse on the injustices of the colonial system and even brought 
about genuine followers of Yi’s theory, who saw it as the Korean intellectuals’ priority to “save” 
the people by helping to modify the national spirit and modernize them. Former collaborators 
who later went on to become political leaders, like Park Chung-hee, adopted these seeds planted 
by Yi and set out developmental projects that would modify the South Korean people’s spirit by 
making them motivated, productive members of society.  
The History of Socialism in Korea 
Socialism, which originated in 19th century Europe, first began to appear in the media and 
official records in the 1880s when newspapers such as Hanseong Soonbo wrote about European 
socialist parties. Socialism became one of the main political ideologies among colonized 
Koreans after the March 1st demonstration of 1919, which mobilized the masses by decrying the 
cruelties under Imperial Japan and the need for political mobilization.93 
Beginning in the late 1910s, many colonial Korean newspapers and periodicals, namely 
The Dong-a Ilbo and Gaebyeok,94 extensively covered topics such as the Soviet revolutionary 
government and Lenin. New Asia Alliance Party, which consisted of Koreans studying abroad in 
Japan, China, and Vietnam, formed the Socialist Revolutionary Party in June of 1920, 
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demanding the abolition of classism, private property, and dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Koreans abroad in Khabarovsk, Russia had also formed the Korean People’s Socialist Party in 
May of 1918. This party actively expanded in size by holding the Korean People’s Socialist 
Party Leaders’ Conference and including the left-wing faction of the New People’s Assocation.95 
The Socialist Revolutionary Party began as a “book club” among a wide variety of interested 
members, all dedicated to the cause of liberating the Korean people from Imperial Japan. One 
faction within the SRP included students studying abroad in Japan who had formed the New 
Asia Alliance Party.  
The Social Revolutionary Party and the Shanghai Faction of the Goryeo Communist 
Party found a consensus in that they prioritized the fight against Japanese imperialism.96 The 
Socialist Revolutionary Party used the occasion of the Founding Conference of the Goryeo 
Communist Party to bring together liberation activist groups. The SRP dismissed the fact the 
Founding Conference was communist in nature when it decided to participate and transform 
itself into the Korean breau of the GCP. The Shanghai Faction of the GCP did not seek to discuss 
or compromise differences among member groups, which later brought about harsh criticisms 
from other Korean communists and internal tension in the later years.97  
The Domestic Bureau of the Goryeo Communist Party used The Dong-a Ilbo and its 
editorial section as the medium for communicating its messages to the masses. The editorial 
section often directly represented the views of its editor-in-chief Jang Deok-soo. Jang Deok-
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soo’s staunch belief in New Liberalism98 which he had maintained since his time as a student in 
Japan and a member of the Shin-a Alliance Party, led to his criticisms of capitalism and its 
structural flaws that require regulations and protections for the powerless.99 Despite his 
opposition to the favoring of the powerful in capitalist systems, Jang did not believe in the 
elimination of private property and disagreed with Marxism in several aspects. Jang argued that 
the Korean people, who were the “powerless,” should form a united front against Imperial Japan 
(the “powerful,”) rather than brew class conflicts among Koreans as the Marxists suggested. The 
fight against Imperial Japan would require cooperation among laborers and management, among 
the bourgeoisie and proletariat.100 
On the other hand, even within the Domestic Bureau, several members such as Kim 
Myeong-shik and Yoo Jin-hui embraced Marxism. Kim was part of the group of new 
intellectuals who studied abroad in Japan, and Yoo was among the new intellectuals who 
received their education within Korea.101 Kim Myeong-shik initially showed New-Liberalist 
tendencies in the early 1920s but later became one of the prominent Marxist figures within the 
Goryeo Communist Party. Kim attributed the Soviet Union’s fall to a dictatorship under Lenin 
not to an inherent flaw in Marxism, but rather to the “deformity of Russian capitalism.”102 Yoo 
draw a parallel between the landowner-tenant farmer relationship and the capitalist-worker 
relationship, and he believed that the tenant farmers would gain a class consciousness and 
gradually make demands for their economic rights, which would ideally culminate in the 
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abolition of the tenant farming system and currencies.103 Considering Yoo’s unwavering stance 
against private property, the abolition of currency would have meant for Yoo the formation of a 
communist society. The Marxist elements within the Goryeo Communist Party believed that the 
pursuit for the modern capitalist civilization was inevitably a part of the Western imperialist 
agenda. This Western imperialist agenda, then, necessarily included Imperial Japan. As long as 
the Korean people operated within this system to bring about change, as New Liberals like Jang 
Deok-soo had wished, the paradox of having to conform to the imperialist agenda while 
demanding the political and economic liberation of the Korean people would persist.104 Marxism 
therefore provided an avenue for pursuing total liberation from Imperial Japan without having to 
negotiate with the Japanese state like the New-Liberal moderates had suggested.  
Conclusion 
The conflicting interpretations of modernity by Yi Gwangsu and the socialist intellectuals 
of Colonial Korea reveal the flexibility in using modernity as propaganda. Factions across the 
political spectrum produced versions of modernity that best suited their worldview and that they 
believed would appeal to the Korean masses – and to Imperial Japan, in Yi’s case. The norms 
and ideas created by these factions – especially that of Yi since the socialists did not gain first- or 
second-face political power in South Korea – proved transformative and continued to impact 
South Korean leaders’ and intellectuals’ discourse on modernity.   
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CASE STUDY 5: SOUTH KOREAN DICTATOR’S  
APPROPRIATION OF MODERNITY 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the evolution of Park Chung-hee’s expressions of modernity, 
from his military coup d’etat in 1961 through the establishment of the Yushin regime in 1972 
until his assassination in 1979. The Park regime had already begun using modernization as a 
propaganda tool in the 1960s and pushed for rapid industrialization, often at the expense of 
poorer rural provinces and low-income factory workers’ basic rights. Park held a deep contempt 
and shame at South Korea’s failure to develop and its history of defeats and colonization, which 
he sought to overcome with state-led modernization and development projects. Park then revised 
his narrative of modernity even further in the 1970s under his Yushin regime to deal with rising 
threats to his legitimacy. The need for appropriating modernity arose from Park’s inferiority 
complex as a former collaborator and rising threats to his political legitimacy. He skillfully 
attached his new version of modernity to existing domestic norms that were becoming salient in 
the early 1970s. The new version of modernity served as a means for minimizing social volatility 
and subduing the increasing popularity of Western consumerism, lifestyles, and – to Park’s 
greatest concern – the ideal of democracy. Moreover, Park’s Yushin-era modernity became an 
end in itself as the dictator became fixated on defeating communism in the public’s eyes and 
solidifying the U.S. alliance to justify the continuation of his dictatorial reign. Park envisioned 
the new Korea under his rule almost as a replica of Manchukuo, a self-reliant modern nation that 
will reign over the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, just as the designers of Imperial 
Japan had once dreamed.  
The Legacy of Meiji Yushin and Manchuria 
  52 
Park Chung-hee admired the Meiji Restoration and the overthrow of the feudal 
Tokugawa regime. In his memoir The Country, the Revolution, and I, Park remarked that after 
maintaining inflexible isolationist policies and a feudal lifestyle for two thousand years, Japan 
quickly rose as a superpower of the Far East within ten years of the Meiji revolution.105 Park 
attributes the success of Japan’s modernization to its foundation in the absolutist rule of the 
Emperor and a “nationalistic love for the country.”106 Thanks to this nationalistic foundation, 
Park argues, the agents of the Meiji revolution could “Japanize” the numerous ideologies 
flooding into the country from overseas.107 Park similarly appropriated elements of Korean 
history and culture to further his discourse on modernization, as will be discussed in this chapter.  
In Park’s eyes, South Korea’s history of poverty and destitution resembled Japan’s 
history prior to the Meiji revolution. Park proudly declared in his 1976 speech to the leaders of 
Saemaul Undong, a government initiative that mobilized farmers and workers, that “the smudge 
of poverty that our country has worn for five thousand years is finally disappearing.”108 For Park, 
his takeover of the South Korean constitution in a self-coup was a revolution for the country, and 
its importance paralleled that of the Meiji Restoration. Park thus named his newly born regime 
“Yushin,” which was the Korean pronunciation for the word Ishin (維新), or “Restoration” in 
Japanese. As Yeon Sik Choi had concluded, “Park Chung-hee’s desire and obsession for 
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modernization originated from his deep-rooted hatred for our [Korean] history.”109 
Growing up under Imperial Japan’s rule of Korea, Park yearned to join the Japanese army 
and rise up the social ranks to become a loyal, equal member of the Empire. In 1939, Park 
Chung-hee had written a letter with his own blood, pleading to the Manchurian Military 
Academy to let him attend the school. Manshu shinbun, a Japanese-language newspaper 
published in Manchuria, featured the bizarre story of a passionate Korean man who pledged 
allegiance to Imperial Japan and the Emperor with blood, popularizing his story and even getting 
him a connection who helped admit him to the academy.110 Park later projected his early-life 
desires to become a Manchurian onto his modernization of South Korea, in which he created 
infeasible yet symbolic development projects and used nationalistic propaganda to motivate the 
working class.  
Anti-Japanese Sentiments and Appropriation of Korean-ness 
 Threats to Park Chung-hee’s regime and its legitimacy originated from domestic anti-
Japanese sentiments, class divisions and social disruption that emerged as a by-product of rapid 
industrialization in the 1960s, and security concerns from overseas. 
First, the masses’ violent opposition to the Park regime’s normalization talks with Japan 
in 1965 demonstrated the vengeance that South Korean people still harbored against Japan.111 
The demonstration likely refueled Park’s fear that he may be seen as an illegitimate leader, for he 
had faced criticisms for his pro-Japanese tendencies. Historian Han Hong-gu recounts an 
anecdote from 1961, when the news of a military coup d’etat reached Japanese political elites. 
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Many Japanese politicians feared that the new South Korean regime would be anti-Japanese, like 
Rhee Syngman’s had been. When they found out that the Japanese name of the new leader Park 
Chung-hee was Dakaki Masao (高木正雄), they recognized his name as the young man from 
Joseon who had attended the Manchurian Military Academy and Japanese Military Academy and 
sighed in relief.112 
At the time of Park’s formal inauguration as president in 1962, Ono Banboku, then-vice 
president of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, praised Park as “a close acquaintance of mine, 
that I could even refer to our relationship as that of a father and a son” to the media in Tokyo.113 
Opposition leaders of South Korea took this chance to criticize Park Chung-hee for letting 
Japan’s politician refer to him condescendingly as a son and thereby damaging the dignity of 
South Korea.114 Ono was one of the most powerful members in Japanese politics at the time, and 
he was among the political elites in postwar Japan that still believed in the ideology of Imperial 
Japan. Ono had claimed in 1960 in a Japanese magazine that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan 
should combine to form the United States of Japan and later add Southeast Asian countries to 
form an Asian federation, essentially calling for the resurrection of the Great East-Asia 
Prosperity Sphere.115 The opposition politicians and the media in South Korea could easily form 
this association between Park Chung-hee and right-wing, imperialistic elites in Japan, implying 
that Park also had allegiance to the bygone ideals of Imperial Japan.  
Therefore, when the public carried out mass demonstrations against the 1965 
Normalization Treaty with Japan, Park likely realized that he could not rely on his police forces 
                                     
112 Han, Hong-gu 한홍구 Yushin: ojik han sarameul wihan sidae 유신: 오직 한 사람을 위한 시대 [Yushin: the era 
for only one man] (Seoul: Hankyoreh Chulpan 한겨레 출판, 2014) p.51. 
113 Han 한홍구, p.51. 
114 Han 한홍구, p.51. 
115 Han 한홍구, p.52. 
  55 
to eliminate the roots of his illegitimacy complex. His earlier narrative of modernity, which he 
had put forth as a national imperative and justification for his industrialization projects, needed 
additional support from domestic norms of nationalism and, especially, “Koreanness.” 
The appropriation of “Koreanness (minjokjeok-in geot)” became popularized in the early 
1970s, coincidentally around the same time as the Park regime sought to revise its notion of 
modernity by adding an element of national pride. Park Chung-hee initially took little interest in 
nationalism and even expressed contempt at the retrogressive tendencies in Korean history. Park 
believed, for instance, that the Korean history itself needed a reform because it mainly consisted 
of disputes among factions, subjugation under foreign powers, and lack of independence and 
willpower.116 The regime initiated their efforts to redefine and appropriate Koreanness by 
implementing cultural policies, such as the restoration of damaged historical sites and buildings 
and censorship of popular media, through three governmental agencies, namely the Ministry of 
Culture and Public Information, the Bureau of Cultural Heritage Management, and the Korean 
Culture and Arts Foundation.117 The government literally and metaphorically excavated figures 
from the past that could resonate with the public and help build an image of the Park regime as 
patriotic. In addition to discovering and repairing physical monuments, the government also 
commissioned the statue of Admiral Yi Sun-sin in 1968 with a personal inscription written by 
Park Chung-hee.118 Admiral Yi, who legendarily fought off Japan’s 1592 invasion of the Korean 
peninsula, continues to be one of revered historical figures in South Korea that serve as icons of 
charismatic leadership and patriotism.  
The appropriation of Koreanness through cultural policies and commissioning of statues 
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served two functions. First, Park used this narrative to mobilize support for anti-communist 
propaganda and later for his state-led development projects. Park Chung-hee had revived the 
then-dormant reserve forces after North Korea’s commando raid in 1968.119 By drawing a direct 
parallel between himself and Admiral Yi, who mobilized civilian militia to defend Joseon against 
Japan, Park persuaded South Korean citizens to join the revived Republic of Korea Reserve 
Forces, also known as the Hyangto Yebigun, and protect the country from North Korea and the 
threat of communism.120 Park had also begun to integrate an image of Admiral Yi as a symbol of 
modernization by create an image of the admiral as a scientist who invented the Turtle Ship, a 
famous battleship used to thwart Japanese invasions, in his 1967 address.121 Second, Park also 
redefined his identity as a patriotic leader by indirectly likening himself to historical figures like 
Admiral Yi, deflecting criticisms that he had once pledged allegiance to Imperial Japan and 
continued to maintain close ties with conservative Japanese politicians.  
Urban Middle Class as the Ideal Modern Citizen 
Second, the rapid industrialization in the 1960s had created a new social group, the urban 
working class, and their grievances due to poor living and working conditions were growing and 
beginning to threaten the Park regime’s stability and legitimacy. The regime responded by 
building an urban middle class that could, for one, prove to the public that living conditions 
under Park had indeed improved. In addition, the regime began to propagate carefully crafted 
propaganda that the urban middle class was a representation of the most admirable social norms 
and characteristics. This propaganda envisioned an urban middle class that was “modern” and 
superior to not only the working class but also the upper class, especially the upper-class women.  
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Despite the fact that most of South Korea’s export revenues came from light industries 
such as textiles, Park Chung-hee turned to the heavy-chemical industries (HCI) in the 1970s as 
he “did not want to be known as the leader of a nation that flourished by exporting wigs, 
plywood, cotton fabrics, and knitwear.”122 The drive to develop the HCIs therefore had a 
symbolic nature and reinforced Park’s vision to build a South Korea that was a self-reliant, 
modern nation-state. Park’s development plan involved privileging certain business groups, 
many of them chaebols, or massive family-owned business conglomerates, if they were willing 
to invest in HCIs. The state-directed development plans in turn produced a greater demand for 
salaried managers and engineers, and “the numbers of professional, managerial, and clerical 
workers (not including sales employees” increased from 6.7 percent to 16.6 percent of the 
workforce in the period between 1963 and 1983.123 This emerging urban middle class could now 
own luxury items, such as televisions, washing machines, and refrigerators, that had previously 
been exclusive to the upper class.124 High-rise apartments were also replacing traditional houses 
in Seoul to accommodate for the influx of rural migrants to cities. One observer in 1963 noted 
that apartments and their “gas, hot water, electricity, phones, and mannered neighbors” were a 
symbol for “culture and civilization,” which was directly in contrast to “a traditional lifestyle in a 
house that has not been improved since the premodern period.”125 These romantic apartments 
were not open to all members of the urban population; the same observer who praised apartments 
as a symbol of culture and civilization found that “residents [of apartments] are usually so-called 
intellectuals, not factory workers or the poor.”126 The urban middle class therefore served as an 
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example to the rest of the South Korean population not only of the great economic achievements 
made under the Park regime, but also what the new country ought to look like. This new vision 
did not include pre-modern ways of living and pushed the urban working class to continue 
working hard and aspire to join the middle class, regardless of whether that rise in 
socioeconomic hierarchy was feasible or not. 
This normative shift was the second main function of the emerging urban middle class. 
Government agencies under the Park regime actively disseminated messages that portrayed the 
urban middle-class women as the ideal South Korean woman, while denouncing upper-class and 
working-class women for failing to dedicate themselves fully to the country’s development. The 
middle-class women were automatically implied to be housewives, and these housewives 
represented “the frugal, disciplined, and self-reliant middle-class lifestyle.”127 Because these 
women worked hard to maintain a respectable household “without wasting money or cheating on 
her husband,” the women’s “salary man” or engineer husbands could work without concerns, 
thereby making the docile middle-class housewives an exemplar of patriotism.128 Upper-class 
women, on the other hand, had endangered South Korea’s economy by consuming Western 
luxury cosmetics and fashion items, according to the government propaganda.129 The urban 
middle-class women therefore became a standard to which the government could compare other 
women and berate them for failing to help build a strong, modern nation-state. The idealization 
of middle-class women did not liberate them, but instead, it confined women to the stereotype of 
dedicated, self-effacing mothers and housewives. Any women who fell outside of the stereotype 
were subject to criticisms under the government’s propaganda.  
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In addition to propping up the urban middle class as an exemplar for the regime’s 
modernization project, Park sought to mobilize labor from the rural working class by allowing 
farmers and workers to view themselves in a favorable light under Park’s Saemaul Undong, or 
the New Village Movement that launched in April of 1970. Under the initiative, Park 
emphasized his lineage as the son of a peasant and described himself as someone who 
understood the hardships of the working class.130 At the same time, Park placed the blame for 
inequality in contemporary South Korea on traditional social structures and vowed to dedicate 
his regime’s modernization project to doing away with such structures.131 Park extended this 
blame also to the “privileged consciousness” of elite groups, which included factions in 
universities, Buddhist establishments, and circles of acquaintances based on school and regional 
ties.132  
The Saemaul Undong also brought about the consent of the workers by remaking the 
identity of the working class, and especially the working-class women. Whereas the government 
propaganda in the cities highlighted the virtues of the frugal, docile middle-class woman, the 
Saemaul Undong offered recognition and social status for working-class women of villages, as 
well. One woman who served as the president of a women’s association remarked that she 
“cannot forget the experience” in which “people recognized me as the president of a women’s 
association of my village [and] I worked hard to fulfill the directives from the top.”133 Even the 
training camps for the Saemaul Undong, which the same woman had attended, created an 
experience for women to feel a sense of agency and recognition for her work, and the woman 
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remembered the camp as “the most exciting time” of her life.134 The Saemaul Undong provided 
an opportunity for the farmers and workers who were often at the bottom of the social ladder in 
South Korea to gain pride for their work and especially for their contributions to the nation’s 
betterment.  
Farmers had become willing to take on a greater financial burden as a result of the 
Saemaul Undong, and the percentage of the farmers’ contributions to the supply of agricultural 
materials had increased from 43.9 percent in 1972 to 89.5 percent in 1979.135 The movement also 
created a hierarchy in which the Saemaul Undong participants and those who were patriotic 
could see themselves as superior. One farmer remarked that he had “chosen this life to live a 
worthy life [...] fighting against the communist North Korea” and expressed contempt toward 
“those who prefer foreign wines over takju (another name for makgeolli, unrefined rice wine) 
and foreign cigarettes over Saemaul brand.”136 This statement showcases the complex web of 
ideologies that the Park regime had appropriated to mobilize the working class, namely anti-
communism, anti-elitism, and nationalism.  
Dreams of Manchuria and the Construction of the Seoul-Busan Expressway 
The building of the Seoul-Busan Expressway was meant to bring out the “Korean spirit,” 
the character of grit and independence that had been lost in history. Park Chung-hee hoped to 
rebuild the Korean spirit and boost the Korean people’s morale by successfully completing the 
Seoul-Busan Expressway.137 In a press conference held on January 15th, 1968, Park Chung-hee 
introduced the term “the Second Economy” to refer to “the invisible aspect of our mentality, or 
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philosophical foundations that are necessary for our citizens’ modernization, or such basis,” 
where as “the First Economy” referred to traditional concepts in the study of economy such as 
“exports” or “increase in yield.”138 The industrialization and modernization projects launched 
under the Park regime with great haste were thus intended to not only boost the traditional 
metrics of economic development but, more importantly, to raise the level of the South Korean 
people’s mentality to that of the first-world, developed nations’ citizenry.  
In fact, Park Chung-hee prioritized the boost of morale as the main goal for the 
construction project over its potential economic benefits, feasibility, or sustainability. Once the 
Park regime secured the funding for the project following heated debates in the National 
Assembly, Park decided to build the expressway with the philosophy of “build first, repair later,” 
since South Korea could not yet afford to construct the expressway like the “developed 
countries” did. In the first ten years following the completion of the construction, the total costs 
for repair and maintenance had already exceeded the initial cost of construction, which was 
roughly 42 billion KRW.139 Park’s modernization projects paralleled Imperial Japan’s territorial 
expansion to Manchuria in that both were expected to incur excessive costs and nonetheless were 
undertaken by the regime. Both projects were not merely economic in their core, but rather an 
extension of the regimes’ desire to further the modernization of their people and reshape their 
consciousness as productive, docile subjects of the modern state.  
Deployment to Vietnam: Combining Anti-Communism and Economic Development 
The Park regime’s deployment of troops to Vietnam allowed the regime to attach its 
narrative of modernity to historical symbols of ethnonationalism and martial masculinity. The 
appropriation of existing historical norms thereby helped mobilize young men for acquiring 
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foreign capital and portrayed Park as a patriotic, anti-communist defender of the nation. Park 
also hoped to prove his nation as a “‘sovereign, mature adult nation’ [that] was now in a position 
to help other nations rather than be helped, as it had been in the past” by deploying troops to 
Vietnam. This mirrors the modernist, imperialistic desires of Japan in the period leading up to 
World War II.140 Park’s government organized public celebrations and farewells for the deployed 
troops that were “reminiscent of the ones performed during the Pacific War under the Japanese 
colonial rule.”141 
The Park regime resurrected historical figures that symbolized the superiority of the Korean 
ethnicity and martial masculinity, which was supposedly an inherently Korean trait, to justify 
South Korea’s first overseas deployment of troops in its history. Park Chung-hee likened the 
deployed troops to “descendants of Hwarang” and called on them to “demonstrate the bravery of 
Korean manhood to the world.”142 The “Hwarang” were elite male fighters under the Silla 
dynasty, which was one of Korea’s premodern states. Park also appealed to the South Korean 
public’s fear of communist dominance, or “Cho ̆khwa t’ongil (red reunification),” to justify the 
deployment of troops to Vietnam.143 Park advocated the deployment of troops to Vietnam as 
imperative for South Korea’s own national security in its fight against communism. In addition 
to portraying the deployed soldiers as representative of the ideal Korean masculinity, Park 
described the soldiers as “‘crusaders of peace’ and ‘crusaders of freedom.’”144The regime had 
therefore imbued military service with the honor of representing the Korean people’s bravery 
and defending the nation from the communist threat. 
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In reality, these soldiers were a means for the Park regime to acquire foreign capital and 
secure its place under the U.S. security umbrella. South Korean journalist Chun-man Kang 
estimated that South Korea earned an average of $200 million per year for nine years during its 
deployment in the Vietnam War.145 Jin-kyung Lee noted that the funneling of low-income young 
men into military service represented “military proletarianization,” which is the process of 
assigning members of the working class to specific positions of labor and is often gendered and 
sexual in its nature.146 The term refers to modern nation-states’ mobilization of their populations, 
in which the state may pressure young men to enlist as soldiers while recruiting young women as 
musical performers to entertain troops, secretaries, factory workers, or even as sex slaves. 
Tom Nairn describes modern-day nationalism as “the modern Janus” that contains both a 
militaristic, repressive side and the development-focused, progressive side.147 Similarly, Park 
Chung-hee’s authoritarian regime incorporated the “twin banner of ‘construction’ (ko ̆nso ̆l) and 
‘national defense’ (kukbang).” The proletarianization of working-class young men to military 
service obtained foreign capital for the state’s exorbitant development projects and strengthened 
the dictator’s image in the public’s eyes as an anti-communist defender. The government had 
“widely popularized as a slogan, ‘Let us build our nation, as we fight,’” proving that “the dual 
axes of militarism and development” helped mobilize resources and political clout for an 
authoritarian regime, as Nairn had predicted.148 
Conclusion 
Park’s inferiority complex as a former collaborator and a dictator required a ruling 
ideology that would legitimize his exorbitant developmental projects and mobilize the badly 
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needed foreign capital. Park successfully attached his definition of modernity to existing 
historical symbols, such as Admiral Yi and the Hwarang warriors, to inspire patriotism and target 
working-class men for deployment to Vietnam. He also took advantage of the existing patriarchy 
to create propaganda that alienated and oppressed women for failing to become docile, “modern” 
housewives. Park had created a version of modernity that could realize his aspirations of building 
a South Korea that would resemble the Manchukuo utopia and bring about popular support for 
his unjustified authoritarian rule. His claim that the Korean people needed an improvement in 
character mirrored Yi Gwangsu’s theory of national modification, while his attempts to redefine 
“Koreanness” in the modernity discourse resembled Joseon Korea’s Dongdoseogiron, or the 
Eastern Ideals and Western Technology Theory.  
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CONCLUSION 
Discussion 
The groups and individuals vying for greater power in the five case studies appropriated 
the idea of modernity to legitimate their superiority over their competitors and their violent, 
repressive control of the masses. In Colonial Korea, factions competed with one another to draw 
the most appealing picture of future Korea as a modern, imperial force in order to win over the 
masses’ hearts. Then, once the winning faction began to govern the modern state, the aspirations 
for imperialism, martial masculinity, and modernity helped effectively mobilize masses to 
further the state’s expansion, as Park Chung-hee did during his military dictatorship. 
The fulfilment of modernity also became an end in itself over time as the pride for one’s 
own identity — as a Japanese man in the Meiji era, for instance — began to rely heavily on the 
status of the Japanese state in relation to neighboring civilizations. The use of modernity as 
propaganda, which was originally a means for legitimating the Meiji-era reforms and preparing 
Japan against Western threats, devolved into a project that was essential for the modern Japanese 
person’s self-efficacy and dignity. Given the worldview that Meiji Japan had created to justify its 
expansion of power, Japan had to prove itself as the dominant civilization over the Great Chinese 
Civilization and the West. Unless Japan transcended borders and oceans to become an imperial 
hegemon, the Japanese person would be as powerless, barbarian, and inferior as the Okinawans 
and the Koreans were in their eyes.  
Some of the factions and nation-states featured in this paper had control over not only the 
third face of power, but over the first and second faces as well. The pro-modernization faction in 
Meiji Japan gained enough physical resources and undertook effective military and political 
strategies to eventually gain physical and institutional dominance. In the first face of power, 
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using military force, Japan was able to occupy Korea and eventually Manchuria. In the second 
face, Japan created policies that excluded the ethnic “others,” namely Koreans and Okinawans, 
from the decision-making process. These policies ranged from explicit limitations on serving in 
political office to repressive language and education policies that relegated the Korean people to 
the status of second-class citizens. The modern institutions of public health, education, and 
languages set up under Imperial Japan were intended to create functional, productive members of 
society while also excluding the non-Japanese subjects from political participation. Even 
Kenkoku University, which intentionally accepted students of diverse ethnic backgrounds, did 
not provide opportunities for its non-Japanese graduates to gain equal standing in society as the 
Japanese elites.  
Not all factions and interest groups discussed in this paper had enough resources, political 
savviness, or readiness to take over the first or second faces of power. In Joseon Korea, 
Myeongseong’s Moderate Enlightenment Faction admired the progress that Qing China had 
made and planned to similarly modernize in a gradual fashion. The modern institutions of public 
health and education under Gojong and Myeongseong served the normative function of 
persuading the masses that Myeongseong’s faction had the superior ideology, contrary to the 
backward, inferior isolationists. The eventual fall of Korea to Japanese Occupation was therefore 
mainly due to Korea’s weakness in the first face of power, rather than its ruling faction’s failures 
in the third face. The colonization of the Korean peninsula was a reality that was difficult to 
accept and one that wounded the ego of many Koreans, both elites and ordinary citizens. This 
paper then examined the narratives that factions and interest groups in Colonial Korea created to 
secure a more privileged, powerful position given such irreversible changes in the Realpolitik.  
The specific conditions that are necessary for an interest group to dominate the first face 
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of power, such as military strategies, diplomatic maneuvers, or the second face of power, such as 
social and political institutions, are beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, this paper focused on 
the rhetorical tools and narratives that appropriating entities used to restructure the distribution of 
third-dimensional power to their advantage. The discussion of Kenkoku University, for instance, 
focused on the university’s normative function in portraying Imperial Japan as generous and 
tolerant of ethnic diversity within the third face of power, rather than its function in furthering 
the institutional exclusion of non-Japanese others in the second face of power.  
Application: Socialist Modernity in Vietnam 
The framework for analyzing the appropriation of modernity under political factions and 
demagogues is not limited to the version of modernity found in this paper. The behavior of 
appropriating modernity and localizing the concept of modernity can be seen in societies that did 
not inherit Imperial Japan’s or the West’s versions of modernity.  
The modernity in contemporary Vietnam shares the three common traits found in this 
paper’s case studies, namely the creation of a hierarchy, aspiration for martial masculinity, and 
attachment to domestic norms. First, Vietnam’s version of modernity privileges socialist states 
that are “more modern” and considers liberal democratic nations like the U.S. as “less modern.” 
Second, the Vietnamese version of modernity celebrates Vietnam’s military history and 
mythologizes its wartime efforts. Lastly, it resurrects historical symbols of ethnonationalism to 
reinforce its appeal to the masses.  
Rebuilding Vietnam’s identity as the modern, superior state was an important part of the 
decolonization process, and the Vietnamese government directed funding and manpower to the 
work of historical research via agencies such as the Research Committee and the Institute of 
History. The government orchestrated commemorative events and revised information in history 
  68 
textbooks to ingrain a new sense of the past in the people’s minds.149 Especially as the possibility 
of a war with the United States grew increasingly likely, the Vietnamese historians focused their 
attention on the idea of national essence (quốc tuý).150 This process of defining a national essence 
involved the “[suppression of] the historical in favor of the mythical.”151 Following the U.S. air 
raids against the North, Vietnamese intellectual Trần Huy Liệu wrote in 1965, “All the 
progressive countries in the world have voiced support for our cause and day by day watch our 
sacred war unfold. . . . At no other moment has the history of our Ancestral Land known such 
glory.”152 This account of Vietnam as a mythical Ancestral Land and the U.S. invasion as a 
“mythical war” made the war itself more bearable and justifiable for the masses. Describing the 
Vietnam War in such mythological, ideal terms glorified “the ideal of collective sacrifice.”153 In 
addition, the rendering of Vietnam and its allies as “the progressive countries in the world” 
indirectly placed the U.S. and Vietnam’s enemies as the less progressive and less developed 
nations. The people’s participation in the Vietnam War was now a part of Vietnam’s long-time 
“tradition of resistance to foreign aggression” and proof of Vietnam’s “sacred” superiority over 
its enemies. Such constructions of Vietnam’s identity as a modern nation-state establishes a 
hierarchy in which Vietnam is superior to the U.S. and other non-socialist states, celebrates 
Vietnam’s martial masculinity, and relies on historical symbols of ethnonationalism. 
Conclusion  
The versions of modernity appropriated and localized by factions and demagogues in this 
paper had long-lasting impact on the norms and values of each society. The imperialist vision of 
                                     
149 Pelley, Patricia M. Postcolonial Vietnam: New Histories of the National Past. Asia-Pacific. (Durham N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 2002) p.6-7. 
150 Pelley, p.140.  
151 Pelley, p.146. 
152 Pelley, p.146.  
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Japan’s elites went on to inspire South Korea’s dictator Park Chung-hee. The developmental 
projects and national propaganda from Park’s era continue to shape South Korean constituents’ 
political beliefs. Vietnam’s version of modernity has likewise evolved into a global project that 
transcends not only borders and oceans, but time periods as well. Following the end of the 
Vietnam War, French-speaking Vietnamese professionals have worked as experts in other 
socialist post-colonies such as Algeria, Mozambique, and Angola, and their presence has 
diffused the norms and values of Vietnam’s socialist modernity.154 Vietnam is thus able to 
contribute to the “worldwide building of a socialist ideal” by “providing their expertise in Africa 
and other continents.”155 As seen in Imperial Japan’s construction of Manchuria as a utopian 
ideal, Vietnam’s version of modernity also grew into a transnational project, one that the 
communist countries hope to propagate to those who are not yet fully developed in their progress 
toward a communist utopia. The concept of modernity is therefore an empty vessel of hierarchies 
that any opportunistic entity – be it Korean or Vietnamese, neoliberal capitalist or socialist – may 
appropriate to reinforce their own worldview and legitimize the violence and coercion used in 
realizing that worldview.
  
                                     
154 Raffin, Anne. "Postcolonial Vietnam: Hybrid Modernity." Postcolonial Studies 11, no. 3 (2008) p.339. 
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